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T urkish-Armenian relations have been deadlocked since Armenia 
gained its independence in 1991. The closed 
border and the lack of diplomatic ties cloud 
the future of bilateral relations as well as offi-
cial and non-official efforts aimed at contribut-
ing to the process of normalization. However, 
Turkish-Armenian relations have been gaining 
momentum since 2002. The restoration of the 
Akhtamar Church, the demonstrations in Tur-
key after the assassination of Hrant Dink, Tur-
key’s EU membership process and finally Turk-
ish President Abdullah Gül’s visit to Yerevan 
in September 2008 are all cornerstones of this 
new era. This recent rapprochement process 
between Turkey and Armenia is also attract-
ing significant attention from the international 
community. The primary reason behind this is 
the fact that the two sides have never come this 
close to a solution of their intricate problems 
during 18 years of bilateral relations.
ABSTRACT
Given its close political, economic, 
social and cultural ties to the 
region, stability, prosperity and a 
cooperative atmosphere in the South 
Caucasus are of great significance 
to Turkey. From this perspective, 
the normalization of Turkey’s 
relations with Armenia is one of the 
priorities of the AKP government. 
So a new era is about to begin in 
Turkish-Armenian relations, which 
up until now have been burdened 
by historical legacies, inertia and 
a lack of trust. The process of 
rapprochement launched with the 
restoration of the Akhtamar Church 
in 2002 is likely to soon result in the 
establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the two countries; however, 
the process is complicated, and it is 
still uncertain when the official ties 
will be definitively established. That 
is why a detailed look at the 18 years 
of deadlock between Turkey and 
Armenia would be helpful in order 
to better understand the changing 
dynamics of the problem.
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Since its foundation, Turkey has had 
problematic relations with its neighbor-
ing countries. In that sense Armenia is 
no exception; however, the lack of official 
ties and the closed land border between 
two countries make the nature of the bi-
lateral relations quite unique. The aim 
of this article is to introduce this special 
relationship between Turkey and Arme-
nia by touching upon the headlines of the problematic relations. After a brief in-
troduction of the main problems and challenges in the relationship, the paper 
will underline the importance of normalization in terms of enhancing stability 
and cooperation in the South Caucasus region with a special focus on the lat-
est regional developments and international actors’ positions regarding Turkish-
Armenian relations. 
The Historical Background
It is pointless to blame only one side for the lack of diplomatic ties between 
Turkey and Armenia and for the closed border that physically separates the two 
societies. In addition to being burdened by historical legacies, inertia and a lack of 
trust, Turkish and Armenian state authorities were also challenged by the break-
out of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the immediate aftermath of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The exacerbation of this conflict strained the negotiation 
process between the two sides while they were discussing the modalities of estab-
lishing diplomatic relations and ultimately led to the entire closure of the Turkish-
Armenian border. 
Nevertheless, the process went well for both sides at the beginning. Turkey rec-
ognized the independence of Azerbaijan on Nov. 9, 1991, and one month later, on 
Dec. 16, the international arena witnessed the recognition of all other ex-Soviet 
countries by Turkey without discrimination. Following the recognition of the new 
Caucasian states, Turkey established official ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and 
the first contacts with Armenia took place in quite a positive atmosphere. Ac-
cordingly, after the recognition of Armenia in the first months of 1992, Turkey 
designated an ambassador for the diplomatic representation office in Yerevan that 
was going to be opened in the near future. High-level diplomatic delegations from 
both sides visited Ankara and Yerevan, respectively, to discuss possible areas of 
cooperation as well as opportunities for trade. In addition to these preliminary 
meetings, Turkey invited Armenia to become a founding member of the Orga-
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nization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The then-Armenian 
president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, represented Armenia at the meeting of heads of 
state of the BSEC countries in Istanbul in 1992, and this also was taken as a sign of 
Armenia’s willingness to improve relations with Turkey.1
However, despite numerous meetings and official visits, Turkey and Armenia 
were not able to establish diplomatic relations. The negotiation process of the 
bilateral protocol for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries encountered several problems and eventually became deadlocked. Tur-
key argued that Armenia did not officially recognize the existing common border 
between the two countries as established by the 1921 treaties of Kars and Gümrü. 
Hence, as a prerequisite for establishing diplomatic relations, Turkey asked for 
an official statement stressing that the independent State of Armenia recognizes 
these treaties and respects the territorial integrity of Turkey. Armenian authorities 
never issued such a statement and argued that there was no need for a declaration 
of this type since neither of the two countries had ever denounced the treaty.2 In 
addition to this problem, the aggravation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict be-
tween Azerbaijan and Armenia led to the suspension of official talks between the 
two sides as well as the closure of the common border. 
A Vicious Circle?
Since the closure of the border in 1993 and the rupture of official ties, vari-
ous nongovernmental actors have tried to fill the gap generated by the absence 
of dialogue between the two sides. In this context, under the pioneering efforts 
of civil society organizations and business representatives from both countries, 
the disadvantages of the closed border have been displayed on several occasions. 
In addition, there have been significant efforts to establish academic and cultural 
exchange programs to develop mutual perceptions in both Turkey and Armenia. 
At the same time, official attempts to normalize relations have continued in some 
form; however, not much has been achieved.
The 1990s was a period of stalemate for both Turkey and Armenia. Turkey 
aimed to coerce and to some extent punish Armenia by not opening the border. 
However, this policy not only failed to bring the expected results, it also deepened 
mutual misunderstandings shaped by the tragedies of the past. The isolation of 
Armenia has in addition encouraged the Armenian diaspora campaigns promot-
ing international recognition of the 1915 events as genocide. The success of these 
efforts in the late 1990s and early 2000s generated a defensive rhetoric in Turkey 
and legitimized the deadlock with Armenia in the eyes of public opinion. Even 
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though the genocide issue was put on 
the Armenian government’s agenda after 
Kocharian was elected president in 2001, 
it is actually the Armenian diaspora that 
has exerted great efforts pushing for the 
adoption of the genocide allegations in 
the parliaments of third-party countries 
to give this issue an international character. Turkey’s official position against the 
recognition of genocide allegations by these legislatures was that such decisions are 
not binding on Turkey under international law. This argument was valid but over-
looks the fact that the “genocide” became a reality (or a fact) in the countries that 
recognized the 1915 events as such. So despite the fact that these decisions bore no 
legal implications, they turned public opinion in these countries against Turkey.
It should be noted that Turkey’s official position regarding the genocide is-
sue has also changed in the last couple of years. Today, the catastrophe of the 
1915 events and the damage it has inflicted on both societies are implicitly rec-
ognized by Turkey. Turkey’s current strategy is to push Armenia for agreement to 
the establishment ofa joint committee of historians. Turkey’s current argument 
is based on Article 2 of the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and holds that genocide is a crime 
committed by individuals and can only be determined by the courts upon histori-
cal evidence, irrespective of the convention’s retroactive irrevocability. So Turkey 
expects reciprocation from the Armenian side for the formation of a joint com-
mittee of historians to collect relevant data and determine if possible the nature 
of incidences. Even though Armenian authorities are not completely opposed to 
this proposition, nothing concrete has been achieved up to the present time for 
the establishment of such a commission. 
Turkey in the South Caucasus
The new momentum in Turkish-Armenian relations should be analyzed 
within the framework of the proactive foreign policy making of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) government. After coming to power in November 
2002, the AKP government continued and accelerated the EU reform process. 
However, this acceleration in the negotiation process also mobilized member 
states that were skeptical of Turkish membership. The increasing number of 
negative voices going hand for agreement to the establishment -in-hand with the 
declining enthusiasm of the AKP for the EU project resulted in a slowdown of 
negotiations. In the meantime, the AKP government has realized that fulfilling 
Today, the catastrophe of the 
1915 events and the damage it 
has inflicted on both societies 
are implicitly recognized by 
Turkey
Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?
23
the political and economic criteria for EU accession will not be enough to make 
Turkey a full member and thus the government has started to invest in Turkey’s 
regional competencies. In other words, the regional leadership card has become 
a bargaining chip against the EU. The South Caucasus was naturally one of these 
regions where Turkey began to invest more, both economically and politically. 
However, the blocked Turkish-Armenian relations came on the agenda as a 
serious challenge to the AKP government’s efforts to develop Turkey’s position as 
a regional power.
It is apparent that given its close political, economic, social and cultural ties 
with the region, stability, prosperity and a cooperative atmosphere in the South 
Caucasus are of great significance for Turkey. Within this perspective Turkey 
wishes to pursue a cooperative policy toward the region in order to consolidate its 
influence, maximize its interests and contribute to peace and stability in its wider 
neighborhood. However, the major global transformation that took place at the 
end of the Cold War directly affected both Turkey and the South Caucasus region. 
Celebrations of the fall of the Soviet Union were short lived since the newly dis-
covered borderlands transformed the old Turkish-Soviet border into an area of 
instability. Disorder in this transit region for oil and natural gas exports from the 
Caspian Sea to Europe concerned Turkey, which has been seeking to become an 
energy hub. That is why ensuring the sustainable stability of the Caucasus region 
became one of the major strategic concerns for the Turkish state. Nevertheless, 
over the past 18 years Turkey’s policies towards the region have been unable to 
ensure this stability.3
The lack of diplomatic ties between Turkey and Armenia jeopardizes Turkey’s efforts to become a 







It can be argued that it is beyond Turkey’s ability to bring stability to the Cau-
casus, which is a border for the Euro-Atlantic area and at the same time a cross-
roads where the interests of many states overlap in a complex pattern. The region 
connects Western markets to Central Asian energy routes and sources and offers 
energy suppliers other than the Russian and Iranian monopolies to Europe.4 In 
other words, the geopolitical struggle developing especially in the South Caucasus 
over its energy resources and energy transport routes has placed the region at the 
center of the global power struggle.5
So where can we place Turkish-Armenian relations in this puzzle? First of all, 
the lack of diplomatic ties between Turkey and Armenia jeopardizes Turkey’s ef-
forts to become a regional leader and also its attempts at mediation for the region’s 
protracted conflicts. The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is a good example in that 
sense. Turkey’s involvement in this conflict as a party rather than a mediator and 
its unconditional support for Azerbaijan motivated by factors both strategic – oil-
rich Azerbaijan’s importance for Turkey – and domestic – Azerbaijan’s status as 
a “kin-state” to Turkey – has limited Turkey’s potential role as a mediator. Still, 
Turkey is eager to act as a negotiator between the two sides, since the resolution 
of this conflict is vital to Turkish interests in terms of both the normalization of 
Turkish-Armenian relations and the establishment of peace and stability in the 
Caucasus.
The second aspect related to Turkish-Armenian relations concerns the fragile 
atmosphere of stability in the South Caucasus. The principal problem in the South 
Caucasus is that the region has been disrupted with three armed conflicts that 
encumber peace and stability. Even though these disputes are labeled as “frozen,” 
the five-day war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 over the breakaway 
province of South Ossetia has once more demonstrated that the conflicts of the re-
gion can easily escalate into harsh military battles. Even though this war changed 
the regional balance and served to accelerate the development of Turkish-Arme-
nian relations by creating new opportunities for normalization, it has also demon-
strated the risks posed by reliance on transport and communication via Georgia. 
When all communication and energy transportation projects through Georgia 
were suspended during the war, Armenia’s availability to become an alternate 
route for oil and gas pipelines running to the West from the Caspian Sea became 
more visible. This surely created a new motive for Turkey to open the border with 
Armenia in order to have an alternate route for pipelines. 
In light of these developments it would not be inappropriate to expect nor-
malization of Turkish-Armenian relations in the near future. Besides it is no se-
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cret that the latest round of negotiations 
between Turkey and Armenia has been 
under way for more than a year. In addi-
tion to Gül’s visit to Yerevan in Septem-
ber 2008, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali 
Babacan has had several meetings with 
his counterpart, Eduard Nalbandian, 
to discuss the modalities of establishing diplomatic ties as well as an initiative 
proposed by Turkey to establish a regional alliance with the participation of the 
three Caucasus states together with Turkey and Russia. Even though the Caucasus 
Platform initiative should be viewed as a process in which the political initiative 
itself is much more important than its potential outcome, Ankara has once more 
demonstrated that Turkey prefers to play an active part in the solution of the prob-
lems hampering regional stability and an atmosphere of peace rather than quietly 
watching developments. 
A Regional Perspective
Here, a closer look at regional developments and the positions of international 
actors would be helpful in order to understand how much the latest changes in 
the regional balance of power have affected the ongoing process of normalization 
in Turkish-Armenian relations. The primary actor in the South Caucasus region 
is certainly Russia, even though it took a while for this country to re-establish its 
dominion in the South Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
Russia affects the future of Turkish-Armenian relations via its dominance over the 
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, which has actually been the major problem in 
Turkish-Armenian relations since the closure of the border. Since Turkey has of-
ficially linked the normalization of bilateral relations with Armenia to a possible 
peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the peaceful resolution of this 
dispute is critical for Turkey. As the largest state in former Soviet Union territory, 
Russia has always been a major party to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The ab-
sence of diplomatic ties with Turkey and the war with Azerbaijan have naturally 
pushed Armenia to the Russian sphere of influence. In addition to the cultural 
and religious affinities between the two countries, Russia has become the protec-
tor of Armenia politically, economically and militarily. In 1997, an agreement of 
friendship and mutual cooperation was signed between Russia and Armenia al-
lowing Russian forces to be stationed in the country. According to the accord, in 
the case of a military clash, both sides would help each other and respond jointly 
against the aggressor party. As such, the deadlock in Nagorno-Karabakh has given 
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Russia a chance to exert great influence 
over Armenia and the South Caucasus.6 
Until the five-day war between Georgia, 
Russia had worked behind the scenes to 
ensure the continuation of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and supported the 
Karabakh clan in Armenia, which prof-
its politically and economically from the 
conflict. However Russia’s strategy to 
freeze the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute apparently changed after the conflict with 
Georgia. Many believed there was a reason why Sargsyan invited Gül to Yerevan 
during a Moscow visit, and it is argued that this gesture signified a change in Rus-
sia’s policy with regard to normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. For the 
first time, Russia stopped interfering with Turkish-Armenian dialogue and even 
tried to promote it.
Regarding the positions of the US and the EU, it can be argued that after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the US started pursuing an active foreign policy in 
the former Soviet territory to fill the power vacuum in the region. It supported the 
region economically and technically to eventually become the area’s hegemon. The 
EU had similar desires as well, but the absence of coherent and long-term foreign 
policy making at the EU level hampered the success of the union’s South Caucasus 
projects, and the EU’s approach towards the region focusing solely on economic 
and technical aspects undermined the union’s efficiency in the region as a political 
and military actor. At the same time, their positions regarding Turkish-Armenian 
relations have always been positive. Both sides favored the immediate resolution 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the normalization of Turkish-Armenian 
relations. However they also effectively used the problematic Turkish-Armenian 
relationship as a bargaining chip in their relations with Turkey and Armenia.
In this context, the genocide resolutions in the US Congress have become a 
permanent source of conflict in Turkish-US relations. Whether 2009 will be an ex-
ception that sees the newly elected US president, Barack Obama, using the g-word 
on April 24 in his traditional commemorative message is still unknown. However 
Obama made firm pledges during his election campaign that he would support 
Armenian diaspora’s campaign to have the genocide allegations recognized if he 
were to be elected. But it should not be forgotten that the executive branch in the 
US traditionally opposes genocide resolutions due to the fact that such a deci-
sion would severely damage Turkish-Armenian relations. Such a move would also 
In Ankara, Obama stated that 
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and reminded both sides of the 
urgency of the normalization of 
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undermine the recent rapprochement 
between Turkey and Armenia by emas-
culating the AKP government’s efforts 
to normalize relations. In addition, the 
visit of Obama to Ankara right after the 
NATO summit in Strasbourg clearly indicates that Turkey will be an indispens-
able actor for the new US government and that Turkey’s regional competencies 
are highly appreciated by Washington. As a result many believe that Obama will 
not want to lose the support of a critical ally like Turkey in the dawn of withdraw-
ing soldiers from Iraq and will not use the word “genocide” in his commemorative 
message in April. In addition, if one tries to decode the speech made by Obama 
at the Turkish Parliament on April 6, 2009, it seems probable that Obama will not 
label the 1915 events as genocide in his April 24 speech as he promised during 
his election campaign in 2008.7 In Ankara, Obama stated that he did not want 
to interfere with the delicate negotiations between Turks and Armenians and re-
minded both sides of the urgency of the normalization of Turkish-Armenian rela-
tions.8 Even though there were rumors claiming that the Turkish-Armenian bor-
der would be opened following Obama’s visit to Turkey, President Gül announced 
that the information reported in the media on Turkey’s opening of the border on 
April 16 was not accurate.9 It should be noted here that the meaning of Obama’s 
visit for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations is exaggerated. The US 
administration has always supported the normalization of Turkish-Armenian ties 
since the deadlock in the early 1990s; however, they also saw no harm in using the 
genocide issue as a bargaining chip in Turkish-US relations. As Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
chief foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has suggest-
ed, the critical aspect of Obama’s visit is that the genocide issue “should not hijack 
the strategic vision of Turkish-US relations or Turkish-Armenian relations.”10 So 
it would be too optimistic to expect a sudden opening of the border after Obama’s 
visit, but his April 24 speech is critical both for the future of Turkish-US and 
Turkish-Armenian relations. 
As for relations with the EU, the genocide allegations and the closed Turkish-
Armenian border play a role in directing the course of Turkey-EU relations. The 
European Commission’s annual progress reports, which evaluate the course of 
the negotiations and the reforms carried out by Turkey, always put emphasis on 
establishing good neighborly relations and the importance of opening the border 
without delay. In addition, some heads of state, such as French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, state on all occasions that it is not possible for Turkey to enter the EU 
without recognizing the genocide and opening the closed border with Armenia.11 
The genocide issue should 
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Another important aspect is the inclu-
sion of Armenia in the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy. This situation indicates 
that the EU puts great emphasis on good 
neighborhood relations in the South 
Caucasus. As is mentioned in a TEPSA 
report: “The EU considers conflict reso-
lution and good neighbourly relations as 
one of its prime foreign policy objectives. 
It calls for all accession candidates to resolve outstanding difficulties with their 
neighbours before acceding to the EU.”12 So it can be argued that Turkey will even-
tually open its closed border with Armenia in order to become a full member of 
the EU. However, the facts that the major EU countries have recognized the geno-
cide claims in their national parliaments and that the Armenian diaspora is well 
organized in Europe decrease the EU’s possible involvement in the normalization 
of Turkish-Armenian relations and the union’s ability to force Turkey on a rapid 
solution. 
Conclusion
In sum, under all the circumstances analyzed in this article, it would be appro-
priate to argue that a basis is provided for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian 
relations. According to diplomatic sources, the establishment of diplomatic ties 
will happen soon. The critical aspect here is that no matter when it takes place, 
this development will surely change the regional balance of power in favor of Tur-
key. However, Turkey should definitely finalize this process without harming its 
good relations with Azerbaijan since the deterioration of Turkish-Azerbaijani re-
lations can sabotage the positive atmosphere that will blossom in the wake of the 
opening of the border and the establishment of official ties between Turkey and 
Armenia.  Here the change in Russia’s position regarding Turkish-Armenian rela-
tions is critical, since it would be too optimistic to expect normalization without 
the consent of Russia.
It is obvious that the opening of the border will be beneficial for both Turkey 
and Armenia. Armenia needs the normalization in order to cooperate with Tur-
key in various spheres including the Black Sea region and the establishment of 
an atmosphere of peace and security in the South Caucasus and also in order to 
deal with the global challenges and threats this country faces. On the other hand, 
Turkey needs to develop good relations with Armenia since the sealed border 
and the absence of diplomatic ties leave Turkey vulnerable to external pressures 
The establishment of official 
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on both sides by reducing 
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from the US and the EU. The lack of official ties with a neighboring country also 
cripples Turkey’s proactive foreign policy goals aiming to increase its regional 
competencies. In addition, the establishment of official relations and the opening 
of the border will launch a confidence-building process on both sides by reducing 
and eliminating mutual misunderstandings. That is why the real normalization of 
Turkish-Armenian relations will become a reality after opening the border, and 
only then will the two sides be able to start working at normalizing the mutual 
perceptions in both countries.
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